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Abstract
The authors study the price–volume dynamics ahead of the ﬁrst public announcement of a
takeover for 420 Canadian ﬁrms from 1985 to 2002. Pre-bid price run-ups in a target ﬁrm’s shares
may be caused by some combination of information leakage due to illegal insider trading or
market anticipation based on rumours in the press. The authors review empirical studies of illegal
insider trading and trading ahead of unscheduled announcements to generate predictions for
abnormal returns and abnormal volume ahead of the takeover announcement. They observe
serially correlated volume and a pattern of return reversals in their sample. Pre-bid run-ups occur
shortly before the actual announcement, accompanied by signiﬁcantly positive abnormal returns
and share volume. The stock prices of the target ﬁrm react signiﬁcantly to the actual
announcement, with both positive and negative reactions. These price–volume dynamics are more
consistent with the predictions of the market anticipation hypothesis than the hypothesis of illegal
insider trading.
JEL classiﬁcation: G14, G18, G34
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets
Résumé
Les auteurs examinent la manière dont évoluent le cours des actions et le volume des transactions
à l’approche d’une offre publique d’achat (OPA); leur échantillon englobe 420 entreprises
canadiennes ayant été l’objet de telles opérations entre 1985 et 2002. Les hausses de cours qui
précèdent une OPA peuvent être dues à une fuite d’information résultant d’opérations d’initié
illicites et/ou à des anticipations du marché liées à des rumeurs véhiculées dans les médias.
Prenant appui sur les résultats empiriques de chercheurs ayant analysé des délits d’initié et
l’évolution du volume des transactions à l’approche d’annonces imprévues, les auteurs génèrent
une prévision des rendements et des volumes anormaux susceptibles d’être observés avant la
première annonce publique d’une OPA. Ils constatent une autocorrélation du volume des
transactions et un renversement de tendance dans les rendements durant la période étudiée. Le
cours de l’action grimpe peu avant l’annonce proprement dite, et tant les rendements anormaux
que les volumes anormaux sont signiﬁcativement supérieurs à zéro. Le prix de l’action de
l’entreprise visée réagit de façon signiﬁcative à l’OPA, aussi bien à la hausse qu’à la baisse. Cette
évolution des cours et des volumes semble davantage tenir à des anticipations du marché qu’à des
fuites d’information découlant de délits d’initié.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G14, G18, G34
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers1
1. Introduction
This paper examines the price–volume dynamics in a target ﬁrm’s shares ahead of the ﬁrst
announcement of a takeover, to determine whether the patterns are consistent with the hypothesis
of illegal insider trading or the market anticipation hypothesis. We study 420 takeovers of publicly
listed Canadian ﬁrms from 1985 to 2002. Studies of takeovers in Canada and abroad consistently
document a run-up in the target ﬁrm’s shares before the takeover bid is made public, which
suggests that some investors are more informed than others during this period. One explanation
for the pre-bid price run-up is that corporate insiders with access to material, non-public
information are trading illegally on this information at the expense of non-informed investors.
Regulators view illegal insider trading as harmful to public welfare, despite arguments that
suggest it is a victimless crime that promotes market efﬁciency (Bainbridge 2000). This activity
may undermine investor conﬁdence, increase the rate of return demanded by less-informed
investors, reduce liquidity in secondary markets, and raise the cost of capital for ﬁrms, thereby
reducing public welfare. Over the 1990s, following a series of high-proﬁle prosecutions in the
United States and abroad, regulators in 53 countries adopted securities laws that restrict when and
how corporate insiders can trade in a ﬁrm’s shares (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002).1
We deﬁne illegal insider trading as trading by corporate insiders while they are in possession of
material, non-public information about the ﬁrm.2 Examples of corporate insiders are senior
management, board members, controlling shareholders, or ﬁnancial intermediaries who are
ﬁduciaries of a ﬁrm, such as auditors, investment bankers, legal counsel, or credit rating agencies,
among others. Corporate insiders may trade legally during certain periods, but are required to
disclose these trades through regulatory ﬁlings.3 Corporate insiders are prohibited from trading
during periods when they are in possession of material, non-public information, such as ahead of
an earnings announcement.
Insider trading investigations and prosecution have been most common in cases of corporate
mergers and acquisitions (Meulbroek 1992). Change-of-control transactions provide an
opportunity for corporate insiders with knowledge of an impending takeover to earn abnormal
1. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) ﬁnd that it is only the enforcement of these laws that leads to a decline
in the cost of capital.
2. The appendix provides details on Canadian insider trading regulations. See MacIntosh and Nicholls
(2002) for a more comprehensive review.
3. Numerous authors have studied these legal insider trades to determine whether insiders earn superior
returns by timing their purchases and sales. See Eckbo and Smith (1998), Finnerty (1976), Jaffe (1974),
Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003), Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Lin and Howe (1990), Rozeff and
Zaman (1988), and Seyhun (1986).2
returns by buying stock in the target ﬁrm ahead of the ﬁrst public announcement and selling after
the bid has been announced. While regulators regularly scrutinize the trading in the target ﬁrm’s
shares after the fact, establishing illegal insider trading using solely econometric techniques is a
difﬁcult and often impossible task (Minenna 2003). The fact that the stock of a target company
experienced abnormal returns and/or volume before the announcement of an acquisition does not
necessarily imply illegal activity. For this reason, studies of corporate takeovers have not been
able to discern whether pre-bid run-ups reﬂect illegal insider trading, the market’s anticipation of
an impending bid in response to legitimate sources such as media speculation, or some
combination of both.
This study outlines the price–volume dynamics that we expect to be associated with each of the
two hypotheses (illegal insider trading and market anticipation), based on a review of both
theoretical models and empirical studies. We discuss two classes of models of informed trading—
strategic trading models and competitive trading models—both of which consider the impact of
asymmetric information on trading behaviour. These models are based on different assumptions
about the nature of private information and the number of investors who have access to it, and
therefore predict different behaviour and trading patterns. In light of these models, we discuss
what might be expected to occur ahead of a takeover announcement to determine whether it is
possible to distinguish between different types of informed trading. We then compare the price–
volume dynamics ahead of takeovers with the stylized facts from empirical studies of known
cases of illegal insider trading (Chakravarty and McConnell 1997, 1999; Cornell and Sirri 1992;
Fishe and Robe 2004; Meulbroek 1992) and trading ahead of unscheduled announcements
(Graham, Koski, and Lowenstein 2003; Chae 2005; Gao and Oler 2004). The insider trading
studies consistently ﬁnd that illegal insider trades are associated with abnormal returns and
abnormal volume on the days when insiders trade, while the impact on market liquidity is mixed
depending on the market structure. Provided that the Canadian and the U.S. markets have similar
market microstructures and institutions, illegal insider trading may be expected to generate the
same effects in Canada as in the United States. Studies of trading behaviour ahead of unscheduled
announcements, such as earnings announcements or dividend changes, ﬁnd that trading volume
increases with mixed results on market liquidity. We analyze our sample in light of these previous
ﬁndings.
Our sample consists of 420 takeover announcements of publicly listed Canadian ﬁrms from 1985
to 2002. The majority of studies of pre-bid price run-ups examine U.S. takeovers. While the
United States has pursued a number of high-proﬁle cases under insider trading laws that have
generated large penalties and even jail terms, similar evidence of enforcement has been lacking in
Canada (Canada 2003; McNally and Smith 2003). This lack of enforcement has contributed to the3
impression among market participants that insider trading is a problem in Canadian capital
markets (Canada 2003; Insider Trading Task Force 2003).4 We examine whether Canadian
regulatory initiatives and institutional changes over the past ﬁve years have affected the
magnitude and frequency of pre-bid price run-ups.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. The magnitude and timing of pre-bid price run-ups for the
Canadian sample are very similar in magnitude to run-ups documented for U.S. takeovers, which
suggests that price discovery occurs in the same manner in both countries. In the weeks ahead of
the announcement, we observe serially correlated abnormal volume without abnormal returns,
and a pattern of return reversals. We observe few days where abnormal returns coincide with
abnormal volume. Pre-bid price run-ups occur shortly before the actual announcement,
accompanied by signiﬁcantly positive abnormal returns and share volume. Targets’ stock prices
react signiﬁcantly to the actual announcement, with both positive and negative reactions. These
price–volume dynamics are more consistent with our predictions for the market anticipation
hypothesis than for the hypothesis of illegal insider trading. While we cannot dismiss the
possibility of illegal insider trading in any takeover in our sample, the evidence suggests that this
problem is not widespread for this type of corporate event.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes competing hypotheses regarding the run-
up in the price of the target ﬁrm’s stock ahead of the ﬁrst public announcement of a takeover. The
strategic and competitive trading models are reviewed, and the stylized facts from empirical
studies of known cases of illegal insider trading and trading ahead of unscheduled announcements
are summarized. Section 3 provides institutional details on takeover legislation and the regulation
of insider trading in Canada (more institutional detail is provided in the appendix). Section 4
describes the sample and the methodology used to calculate abnormal returns and trading volume.
Section 5 analyzes pre-bid run-ups and examines the pattern of abnormal returns and volumes. We
benchmark our results against existing U.S. studies, and provide panel regressions of abnormal
return on abnormal volume for our sample. Section 6 concludes.
2. Explanations of Pre-Bid Price Run-Ups
Studies consistently find a price run-up (a “pre-bid run-up”) in the target firm’s stock that
becomes statistically significant in the days or weeks before the takeover bid is first made
4. Market Regulation Services Inc., RS Notice, “Results of the RS Survey of Canadian Equity Trading
Practices,” 22 October 2004. Available at: <http://docs.rs.ca/ArticleFile.asp?Instance=100&ID=
018F38AABEC148E9BE816D3B3ABC9A71>.4
public.5 This run-up is accompanied by higher-than-normal trading volume that may lead the
price run-up by more than a week (Gao and Oler 2004).6 Two hypotheses are generally offered to
explain the pre-bid run-up and abnormal volume, with empirical results that support both.
The information leakage hypothesis argues that investors learn about an impending takeover bid
through the trades of insiders who have access to material, non-public information (Keown and
Pinkerton 1981). Corporate insiders may trade illegally using this private information, or they
may tip this information to third parties such as family members, friends, or accomplices, who
then trade on the basis of material, non-public information. Trading by insiders may be detected
by market makers, who infer the presence of informed traders in a stock by observing the
characteristics of order ﬂow (O’Hara 1995; Madhavan 2002). Alternatively, investors may mimic
insider trades disclosed in regulatory ﬁlings, in the belief that corporate insiders are trading on the
basis of undisclosed, material information.7 Concrete support for the information leakage
hypothesis has been provided by studies that use actual data on illegal insider trades made public
following prosecutions by U.S. regulators (Cornell and Sirri 1992; Meulbroek 1992; Chakravarty
and McConnell 1997, 1999; Fishe and Robe 2004).
The market anticipation hypothesis argues that sophisticated investors are able to predict a
takeover bid through legitimate sources, such as ﬁrm or industry analysis, analyst forecasts,
technical analysis, or rumours in the ﬁnancial media (Jensen and Ruback 1983). This hypothesis
is closely related to the efﬁcient market hypothesis, where prices always “fully reﬂect” available
information (Fama 1970, 1991). Studies that support the market anticipation hypothesis include
Asquith (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Gupta and Misra (1989), Sanders and Zdanowicz
(1992), and Pound and Zeckhauser (1990).
The principal difﬁculty in distinguishing empirically between the information leakage hypothesis
and the market anticipation hypothesis is that both explanations are based on informed trading.
5. Pre-bid run-ups have been documented in studies that employ U.S., Canadian, and U.K. data. For
representative studies that use U.S. data, see Gao and Oler (2004), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Jensen
andRuback(1983),andSandersandZdanowicz(1992).FortheUnitedKingdom,seeFranksandHarris
(1989). For Canada, see Eckbo (1986), Amoako-Adu and Yagil (1986), Eckbo and Thorburn (2000),
and Jabbour, Jalilvand, and Switzer (2000).
6. Studies that ﬁnd abnormal volume ahead of the takeover announcement include: Conrad and Niden
(1993), Chae (2005), Eyssell and Arshadi (1993), Gao and Oler (2004), Graham, Koski, and
Loewenstein (2003), and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989). The exception is Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992),
although they use the log of raw volume, notshare turnover.
7. Generally, investors cannot earn abnormal returns by duplicating the trades of insiders, particularly
when transactions costs are taken into account (Rozeff and Zaman 1988). Seyhun (1986), Rozeff and
Zaman (1988), and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) show that most of the abnormal returns are reduced
when controllingfor size, value effects, and transactions costs.5
But the identities of the informed traders are not known ex ante and may not be known ex post.
Without a model to distinguish between different types of informed trading—for example, when
information is concentrated, as in illegal insider trading, or dispersed, as in market speculation by
sophisticated institutional investors—patterns in stock behaviour cannot be used to distinguish
between these two hypotheses (Minenna 2003). Despite this shortcoming, regulators such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have developed detection algorithms that attempt to
identify illegal insider trading based on patterns of price and volume ahead of major corporate
events (Meulbroek 1992; Mitchell and Netter 1994).
We consider whether different patterns in abnormal returns and abnormal volume could be useful
for distinguishing between the sources of informed trading. We review two classes of models of
informed trading—strategic and competitive—that consider trading under conditions of
information asymmetry. Each of these models makes predictions for price and volume dynamics
based on different assumptions about the nature of the private information, the number of traders
who have access to this information, and the time period during which informed traders can take
advantage of this information. We then review empirical studies of known cases of illegal insider
trading and trading ahead of unscheduled announcements. The key characteristics of these models
and the stylized facts from the empirical studies suggest different patterns of price–volume
dynamics that may be useful for distinguishing between the two hypotheses.
2.1 Illegal insider trading
The strategic trading models of Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) describe how an
insider will trade strategically to maximize the proﬁts from their private information.8 These
models do not consider the identity of this insider but feature a representative insider, a risk-
neutral market maker, and many uninformed liquidity traders. Liquidity traders are non-strategic
and trade for motives that are exogenous, such as portfolio rebalancing or hedging.9 Some have
no discretion on the timing of their trades (“non-discretionary liquidity traders”), while others
have limited discretion subject to the constraint of trading a particular number of shares within a
given period (“discretionary liquidity traders”) (Admati and Pﬂeiderer 1988). A market maker
updates quoted prices by observing order ﬂow, which allows them to learn about the fundamental
value of a stock. The insider will optimally trade when liquidity traders are active, so that the
private information in their trade is not revealed immediately. The informed trader does not
8. The Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) models are representative of strategic trading
models, although many models developed in the market microstructure literature consider various
settingsandassumptions.Ourdiscussionisnecessarilylimitedanddoesnotdojusticetothecomplexity
of these models.
9. A good example would be mutual funds that track a major equity index.6
observe the current orders of liquidity traders, but infers their behaviour based on past patterns.
Kyle (1985) notes that, despite their small trading volume, the insider ultimately determines what
price is established at the end of trading because their trades, unlike the trades of liquidity traders,
are positively correlated from period to period. The market maker observes this pattern in the
order ﬂow and adjusts their quotes, leading to price discovery. The insider’s trades have a
permanent impact on price, unlike trades by liquidity traders, which have a temporary impact due
to inventory effects (O’Hara 1995; Madhavan 2002). Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) argue that
abnormal volume occurs because the increased liquidity that occurs when the insider and the non-
discretionary liquidity traders are active induces discretionary liquidity traders to transact, thereby
leading to a concentration in trading volume in a limited period. As a result, the private
information in insider trades moves the stock price and creates abnormal returns, whereas the
extra trading generated by insiders and discretionary liquidity traders creates abnormal volume.
Cornell and Sirri (1992) and Chakravarty and McConnell (1997, 1999) were the ﬁrst to test the
predictions of strategic trading models using known cases of illegal insider trading, although they
focus on the impact on bid-ask spreads. We focus instead on the price–volume dynamics that may
be exhibited when illegal insider trading occurs. In the setting of a takeover, the insider may be a
senior manager or board member of the acquirer (in the case of a hostile bid), the target (in the
case of a friendly bid), or a ﬁnancial intermediary involved in the takeover process. These
corporate insiders have relatively precise knowledge about the value of the takeover bid and the
timing of the announcement. This non-public, material information should be expected to
inﬂuence the strategy of someone who trades illegally while in possession of it.10 With a known
time horizon and little competition from other informed traders, the corporate insider can execute
a trading strategy designed to extract the maximum proﬁts with the least probability of detection.
In practice, a corporate insider may trade in the target or acquirer’s stock, options on this stock, or
even the stock of a similar company (“substitute trading”).11 We consider trading in the target
ﬁrm’s stock only. Given the existence in most countries of laws that prohibit insider trading, we
expect corporate insiders to avoid trading close to the announcement date, when the scrutiny of
regulators is greatest and the probability of detection is highest.
The stylized facts from actual cases of illegal insider trading are consistent with the predictions of
strategic trading models. Illegal insider trades generate abnormal returns and are associated with
greater than normal trading volume. In the case of Anheuser-Busch’s 1982 acquisition of
10. Fishe and Robe (2004) consider the most extreme case: insiders had about one hour to beneﬁt from the
private information they received, leading to very speciﬁc trading strategies.
11. Chakravarty,Gulen,andMayhew(2004),Easley,O’Hara,andSrinivas(1998),andHyland,Sarkar,and
Tripathy (2003) study informed trading usingstock options or other derivative strategies.7
Campbell Taggart, Cornell and Sirri (1992) ﬁnd that abnormal returns occur only on days when
corporate insiders trade, although they ﬁnd that insiders receive better market execution because
the illegal insider trades induce “falsely informed” (or noise) traders to transact, which leads to
increased liquidity and inhibits a rise in the effective bid-ask spread. These falsely informed
traders behave like the discretionary liquidity traders hypothesized by Admati and Pﬂeiderer
(1988). Meulbroek (1992) studies illegal insider trading cases pursued by the SEC during the
1980s, of which takeovers represent 79 per cent of the sample. She ﬁnds that 43 per cent of the
run-up in a target ﬁrm’s stock occurs on insider trading days, and this amount is greater than the
run-up that occurs on days with public news announcements or no-news days. Although the
volume of illegal insider trading is small relative to the total daily volume, Meulbroek (1992)
ﬁnds that it constitutes much of the abnormal volume on insider trading days.
Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between
Ivan Boesky’s illegal trades and changes in the price of Carnation’s stock ahead of a takeover by
Nestlé. In a subsequent study of the same case where the authors use signed, high-frequency order
ﬂow, Chakravarty and McConnell (1999) cannot distinguish between illegal insider trades and
other buyer-initiated trades on Carnation’s stock: both have a signiﬁcantly positive impact. This
result is consistent with the prediction of strategic trading models that insiders are able to hide
their trades in the order ﬂow. Finally, Fishe and Robe (2004) study a 1999 case of illegal insider
trading involving Business Week’s “Inside Wall Street” column. Consistent with theory, they ﬁnd
that increases in price and volume occur in response to illegal insider trades.
This review of the strategic trading model and studies of illegal insider trading suggests a number
of testable predictions. Illegal trades by corporate insiders should generate abnormal returns,
since their private information contributes to price discovery. Abnormal returns should occur on
days with abnormal volume, because non-discretionary liquidity traders are induced to trade by
the increased order ﬂow when insiders are active. Illegal insider trades should therefore be
identiﬁed by abnormal returns coinciding with abnormal volume on the same day. Abnormal
returns that are not accompanied by abnormal volume (or vice versa) would constitute a rejection
of this hypothesis. Given that the corporate insider should want to avoid revealing their private
information by trading aggressively, these trades should be interspaced over the weeks prior to the
announcement, leading to an irregular pattern of spikes in abnormal returns and abnormal volume.
The illegal insider trades should generate price discovery, so that the reaction of the stock price to
the takeover announcement should be limited. In the extreme case where price discovery is
complete, the share price should not react. Formally, we hypothesize as follows:8
H0: Pre-bid run-ups ahead of takeovers caused by illegal insider trading should be associated
with abnormal returns coinciding with abnormal volume in the weeks ahead of the
announcement, abnormal returns that follow a random walk on days when corporate insiders are
not trading, and a limited price reaction in the takeover target’s stock price following the
announcement.
2.2 Market anticipation
The competitive trading models of Wang (1994), He and Wang (1995), and Llorente et al. (2002)
model the behaviour of investors that are heterogeneous in their information about the state of the
economy and their private investment opportunities. They do not formally consider market
makers or corporate insiders per se, but address the trading of informed and uninformed investors
outside a ﬁrm. To avoid confusion with the terminology of the strategic trading model, we refer to
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors when discussing the predictions of this model.
Sophisticated investors trade for two reasons: to rebalance portfolios for risk-sharing (“hedging”),
or to take advantage of proprietary information about future payoffs for a stock (“speculating”).
This proprietary information is the outcome of the sophisticated investors’ analysis of public
information, and is not the material, non-public information of a corporate insider.12
Unsophisticated investors know they are trading with sophisticated investors, but are still willing
to trade, because not all the trades are made against sophisticated investors’ superior information.
In these models, trading volume is always positively correlated with price changes, and the
return–volume dynamics of a stock during intensive trading periods reﬂects the proportion of
hedging vs. speculative trades. Llorente et al. (2002) argue that hedging trades due to portfolio
rebalancing should generate negatively autocorrelated returns. Speculative trades based on
proprietary information, however, should generate positively autocorrelated returns and serially
correlated volume over a number of days following the initial trade, as the proprietary information
about the stock becomes incorporated in the price.
He and Wang (1995) model how sophisticated investors will trade ahead of an unscheduled
announcement. They assume that the value of a stock has two components: a fundamental portion
about which sophisticated investors have proprietary information and a residual portion about
which they have no proprietary information. Whereas the true value of the fundamental portion is
revealed over time through trading, the value of the residual portion is never revealed before the
terminal date. Thus, residual uncertainty about the value of the stock remains until the terminal
date. The weight of these two factors affects the aggressiveness of trading. On the one hand,
12. U.S. securities regulations make this distinction, because trades by sophisticated investors that might
otherwise be considered illegal insider trading are viewed differently under the “mosaic” theory.9
uncertainty about the stock’s fundamental value decreases as the terminal date approaches and
more proprietary information is revealed through trading, which tends to make sophisticated
investors speculate more aggressively over time. On the other hand, as the terminal date
approaches, there are fewer trading opportunities left and it becomes more difﬁcult to unload any
positions. Since no investor has information about the residual portion of the stock’s value, it is
optimal for sophisticated investors to reduce their speculative positions before the terminal date.
This tends to make speculation less aggressive. The relative size of the two factors in the stock’s
value determines sophisticated investors’ dynamic trading strategies. When sophisticated
investors’ private signals are low relative to the noise in the market and the uncertainty about the
fundamental value of the stock is small (but greater than zero), both the aggressiveness of trading
by sophisticated investors and their expected stock position increase until a few periods before the
terminal date, and then decrease, resulting in high volume shortly before the announcement.
In the setting of a takeover, sophisticated investors are likely institutional investors that actively
manage portfolios of stocks, or risk arbitrageurs that create long-short portfolios of targets and
acquirers. These investors do not have access to the material, non-public information of corporate
insiders. Instead, they extract signals about a potential takeover from public information through
in-house analysis of industry trends, conversations with equity analysts, or monitoring of factors
speciﬁc to a company, such as ﬁnancial distress or the statements of managers and controlling
shareholders. Unlike the private information of insiders, the proprietary information of
sophisticated investors is noisy and generates probabilistic predictions on the likelihood of a
takeover. When the likelihood is high, sophisticated investors do not know the true price offered
by the bidder with any certainty, nor do they know the exact timing of the announcement. The
public information that identiﬁes a ﬁrm as a takeover candidate may be received by a wide group
of sophisticated investors, who compete with each other to identify undervalued stocks. This
dispersion of information affects the trading behaviour among these investors.
In the months preceding a takeover announcement, high uncertainty and investor heterogeneity
will result in a low degree of speculative trading and a pattern of return reversals on high-volume
days, reﬂecting the presence of both hedging and speculative trading. In other words, high volume
should not generate price changes if information heterogeneity is high (Grundy and McNichols
1990; Harris and Raviv 1993; Kim and Verrecchia 1994). Closer to the date of the actual takeover
announcement, the number of signals will increase and uncertainty should decline, leading
sophisticated investors to speculate more aggressively. At this point, stock returns should exhibit
positive autocorrelation with high volume as market speculation—whether accurate or not—
becomes incorporated into prices, leading to a pre-bid run-up. Because residual risk remains until
the announcement, the target’s stock price should react signiﬁcantly to the announcement.10
Abnormal returns in response to the announcement may be either positive or negative, depending
on the accuracy of the market’s speculation.
A large empirical literature explores the relationship between informed trading and price–volume
dynamics.13 Of interest to our study are several recent papers that examine trading behaviour
before unscheduled events.14 Graham, Koski, and Loewenstein (2003) study surprise dividend
announcements and ﬁnd that abnormal volume increases before the announcement with no
change in liquidity; they therefore conclude that informed trading before unanticipated events is
not detected by market makers. Chae (2005) ﬁnds that trading volume increases before
unscheduled announcements, such as a takeover bid or a credit rating change, and that market
makers increase their price sensitivity as measured by price-impact coefﬁcients. Both studies ﬁnd
increased trading volume but mixed results on liquidity, although neither study considers the
impact on returns.
Both the theoretical models and the empirical studies predict an increase in trading volume ahead
of an unscheduled event. The theoretical models further predict autocorrelated returns in response
to speculative trades based on proprietary information, with research by Llorente et al. (2002)
providing empirical support. Applying these predictions to the market anticipation hypothesis, we
can expect trading behaviour ahead of a takeover to display these price–volume dynamics when
the cause of the pre-bid run-up is speculation by sophisticated investors based on proprietary
information, not illegal insider trading by corporate insiders. Formally, we hypothesize as follows:
H1: Pre-bid run-ups ahead of takeovers caused by market speculation should exhibit abnormal
volume but no clear pattern in abnormal returns in the weeks ahead of the announcement,
followed by intense trading and positively autocorrelated price and volume shortly before the
announcement date. The announcement itself should generate a signiﬁcant reaction in the target’s




Wang 1994), market liquidity (Copeland and Galai 1983; Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Kyle 1985), and
trade size (Easley and O’Hara 1987).
14. Brooks, Patel, and Su (2003) study the market reaction when ﬁrms experience events that are totally
unanticipated, such as the death of a CEO, or a major disaster, such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill.
Because no one has private information about these events, the market reaction occurs after the event.11
2.3 Summary of predictions
Table 1 summarizes the price–volume dynamics ahead of a takeover consistent with the
competing hypotheses for explaining pre-bid run-ups. These predictions ﬁnd their theoretical
support in the review of the strategic and competitive trading models. The key distinction between
the illegal insider trading hypothesis and the market anticipation hypothesis relates to the
relationship between abnormal returns and abnormal volume, the pattern and the timing of the
run-up, and the reaction to the announcement. Because the existing hypotheses for explaining pre-
bid run-ups do not make any speciﬁc predictions about market liquidity, the pattern of bid-ask
spreads cannot be used to distinguish between informed trading by corporate insiders versus
sophisticated investors. The analysis below therefore focuses on the price–volume dynamics.
3. Institutional Background
In contrast to studies of disclosed insider trading in the United States, Jabbour, Jalilvand, and
Switzer (2000) ﬁnd that Canadian insiders trade more frequently in the period shortly before a
takeover bid is announced. McNally and Smith (2003) also ﬁnd large-scale evidence of reporting
violations, based on a study of stock buyback programs and insider trading around signiﬁcant
news announcements. This behaviour may be due to the weak enforcement of insider trading laws
in Canada (Canada 2003; Insider Trading Task Force 2003).15 McNally and Smith (2003)
examine the enforcement record of insider trading prosecutions in Canada; they ﬁnd that the
number of cases is small, the average case takes four years to be settled, and the penalties are
generally far below the proﬁts earned. Given the ﬁndings of these studies, it is not surprising that
Canadian market participants are concerned about insider trading. A recent survey of Canadian
equity trading practices conducted by Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS Inc.), the independent
regulator for Canadian equity markets, ﬁnds that market participants view manipulative and/or
deceptive trading and insider trading as the top two risks facing Canadian markets.16
15. Concerned about the perceptions of market participants regarding the issue of insider trading, Canadian
securitiesregulatorsandself-regulatorybodiesformedataskforcetostudythisissue.Thereport,issued
inNovember2003,highlightsanumberofkeydifferencesintheregulationofinsidertradinginCanada
relative to the United States, such as a lack of speciﬁc requirements on containing insider information
for lawyers, accountants, and banks in Canada (Insider Trading Task Force 2003). A second report
commissioned by the Canadian government argues that the framework of securities regulation in
Canada,withresponsibilitysharedby13provincialregulators,maycontributetothispoorenforcement
record (Canada 2003).
16. RS Notice, “Results of the RS Survey on Canadian Equity Trading Practices,” 22 October 2004. See
footnote 4 for the web address.12
Both provincial and federal authorities have responded to the perception of lax enforcement of
insider trading regulations in Canada. The federal government’s Bill C-13, passed in March 2004,
increases the punitive and criminal penalties for insider trading, making it an offence under the
Criminal Code punishable by up to 10 years in prison.17 The legislation also establishes special
police teams to pursue investigations in this area.18 At the provincial level, Ontario introduced
amendments to the legislation governing securities and commodity futures in April 2003. These
amendments increase penalties and give the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) more
enforcement power for certain offences. These changes are expected to bolster investor
conﬁdence in Canadian capital markets, both domestically and internationally.
Although the impact of recent changes will be perceived only with time, we examine whether
other regulatory and technological changes introduced over the past ﬁve years have had any
impact on the size of pre-bid price run-ups. The regulations governing the reporting of insider
trades have been enhanced to shorten the reporting period and make the trade date available
electronically over the Internet.19 The resources devoted to the detection and enforcement of
securities regulation increased in late 1997 when the OSC, which has oversight responsibility for
the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), converted to an independent, self-funded entity. As a result of
this change, the budget devoted to enforcement increased, with stafﬁng in this area rising by
75 per cent over the next year. A new self-regulatory body, RS Inc., was created in March 2002 to
supervise Canada’s stock markets. RS Inc.’s mandate is to protect investor conﬁdence and
enhance market integrity on the exchanges that it regulates.20 The infrastructure covering trading
has also changed, providing regulators with more powerful tools and algorithms to monitor
trading. The TSX, Canada’s major stock exchange, closed its trading ﬂoor in early 1997 when all
remaining ﬂoor-traded stocks began to trade on its computer-assisted trading system (CATS).
The greater commitment of resources and regulatory changes from 1998 onwards may be
expected to reduce the incidence of illegal insider trading in Canada, and potentially reduce price
run-ups ahead of takeover announcements if they are caused by information leakage. We test
these hypotheses using Canadian data.
17. Bill C-13 is entitled “An Act to amend the Criminal Code (capital markets fraud and evidence-
gathering).”
18. IntegratedMarketEnforcementTeams(IMETs)wereestablishedin2003,jointlymanagedbytheRoyal
Canadian Mounted Police, Justice Canada, and partner departments. These teams focus on white-collar
crime, and work closely with securities regulators and other federal and provincial authorities.
19. In December 1999, the time frame for paper reporting of insider trading was reduced, with insiders
required to report within 10 days of the trade date. The paper-based system was replaced with the
introduction of the System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders in October 2001.
20. OneoftheﬁrstinitiativestakenbyRSInc.wastofocusattentionontheissueofillegalinsidertradingin
Canada, which led to the reportby the Insider Trading Task Force (2003).13
4. Data and Methodology
4.1 Data
We purchased Canadian data on 1,125 takeover announcements of TSX-listed ﬁrms between
January 1985 to December 2002 from Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation
(International Mergers Database) and Crosbie and Company. This sample includes both
completed and withdrawn bids. Leveraged buyouts, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tenders,
exchange offers, repurchases, minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, and
privatizations are excluded from the sample. We checked important details on these transactions
against the original press release announcing the takeover. More details on the takeover process in
Canada are provided in the appendix.
We collected market data on stock prices, returns, trading volume, and shares outstanding from
the TSX-Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre (TSX-CFMRC) database. Trading data
were available for only 844 deals. We excluded 136 subsequent bids that were made within two
years from a previous bid for the same company’s stock, because these ﬁrms were “in play” and it
is reasonable to expect that the market anticipated a subsequent bid. We then excluded
288 takeovers of ﬁrms whose shares were infrequently traded prior to the takeover as an accurate
measure of abnormal returns and volume could not be calculated for these ﬁrms. We identiﬁed
these ﬁrms using the methodology described by Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991). To be
included in our sample, the target ﬁrm’s shares had to have at least 50 non-missing returns during
the estimation window that lasted from 250 trading days to 61 trading days prior to the
announcement, [-250,-61], and at least 75 per cent of non-missing returns from 60 days prior to
2 days following the announcement, [-60,2]. The ﬁnal sample size is 420 transactions from 1985
to 2002.
Asquith (1983) and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) discuss the importance of identifying the correct
announcement date to measure pre-bid trading in a takeover target. We established the “news-
adjusted” announcement date for the transactions in our sample by using Factiva to search major
newspapers and newswires for stories on corporate control events during the six months prior to
the formal takeover bid for each target company. The formal announcement date represents a
press release by a target or acquirer that closely precedes the issuance of a takeover circular
disclosing important transaction details. The “news-adjusted” announcement date is deﬁned as
any public news story prior to the formal announcement date that includes: an announcement by a
target ﬁrm that it is negotiating a change in control, whether a buyer is named or not; an
announcement by the target ﬁrm that it will look for the buyer or merger partner “to maximize14
shareholders’ value”; an announcement by the target’s major shareholder of the intention to sell a
controlling block of shares; an announcement by a target ﬁrm that it had been negotiating a
merger or takeover that failed due to differences between the management of the two parties; or an
announcement by the acquirer of a takeover intention. Out of 420 deals, 102 were determined to
have a news-adjusted announcement date. The mean and median numbers of calendar days
between the news-adjusted date and the formal announcement date were 60 and 56 days,
respectively. We also identiﬁed media stories about rumoured takeover deals, where rumours are
stories that name the target but do not provide any speciﬁc information about the acquirer or the
terms of the transaction.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the ﬁnal sample. The average market capitalization of a
takeover bid based on the average closing price times shares outstanding over the window
[-250,-61] was $537 million, with a median of $92 million, and a standard deviation of
$1,589 million.21 In 77 out of the 420 takeover, the acquiring ﬁrm had purchased a toehold in the
target ﬁrm’s shares. In these cases, the mean (median) toehold in the target ﬁrm’s shares was
22 per cent (15 per cent).
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) document how mergers
happen in waves and cluster by industry, in response to industry-speciﬁc shocks such as
deregulation or technology changes. These patterns may make it possible for analysts to predict
likely takeover targets.22 In our 18-year sample, there are more takeovers over the second half of
the sample period, with the number of takeover bids increasing sharply from 1995 onwards.
Almost 75 per cent of the transactions took place from 1995 to 2002, with 25 per cent occurring in
the ﬁnal three years of the sample. More than half of the takeover bids were for natural resource
ﬁrms, deﬁned as ﬁrms engaged in the exploration, production, and transportation of oil, gas,
minerals, metals, and other commodity-related products. Two active periods for takeovers in this
industry occurred from 1997 to 1998 and from 2000 to 2001. Similarly, takeovers of information
technology ﬁrms were prominent from 1999 to 2001, but make up less than 10 per cent of the
sample.
21. Theaveragesharepriceofatakeovertargetwas$9.60,withamedianpriceof$5.40.Only12 percentof
the firms in our sample were “penny stocks,” with an average closing share price over the window
[-250,-61] of less than $1. Given the speculative nature of penny stocks discussed in Masse, Hanrahan,
and Kushner (1998), we conﬁrm that our results are robustto the exclusion of these ﬁrms.
22. GaoandOler(2004)provideevidencethatmarketmakersmonitortakeoverﬁrmsandtheircompetitors.
They ﬁnd that the bid-ask spreads of takeover targets rise prior to the announcement and drop sharply
after it. The spreads for ﬁrms with the same characteristics rise and remain abnormally high after the
announcement, which suggeststhat the risk of a takeover remains for these ﬁrms.15
Hostile takeovers are relatively rare in this sample, and represent only 15 per cent of takeover
bids, similar to the case in the United States (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001). The high
percentage of friendly takeovers makes it more likely that information about the takeover may
have leaked out prior to the announcement. Given the high proportion of friendly takeovers, it is
not surprising that two-thirds of the bids were completed. Fewer than 10 takeovers were only
partially completed, where the acquirer purchased a controlling stake but did not make an offer for
all outstanding shares in the target.
The number of rumoured takeover deals exhibits no discernible pattern. The number of rumours
increases noticeably through the late 1990s, reaching a peak of 26 per cent of deals in 1999. The
increased number of rumours in the latter half of our sample may be due to greater availability of
information through sources such as the Internet or electronic media. In this case, it may be
associated with greater market speculation and higher price run-ups for this period.
4.2 Methodology
We conduct a standard event study to examine abnormal returns and trading volume following the
methodology in MacKinlay (1997). The “zero date” in our study, , is the date of the ﬁrst
public announcement of the takeover. Given that takeover announcements may be announced
when the market is closed, or may be reported in the ﬁnancial media the day following the
announcement, we include the trading day after the announcement in our zero date, so our event
date is [0,1]. Our event window begins 60 trading days prior to the ﬁrst public announcement and
ends 20 trading days after that date, [-60, 20]. Our estimation window begins 250 trading days
before the ﬁrst public announcement and ends 61 days before the zero date, [-250,-61]. We
calculate daily abnormal returns (ARs) for target ﬁrm and event date in our sample according
to the equation:
,
where , and are the abnormal, actual, and normal returns, respectively, for the
time period . is the conditioning information for the normal return model. We estimate
normal returns over the estimation window [-250,-61] using two models: a standard market model
and a 2-factor market model that includes an industry index.23 For any security , the market
model is:
23. We also estimate a constant mean return model described in MacKinlay (1997), but ﬁnd the results for
statistical signiﬁcance are the same. Results are available upon request.
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where and are the period- returns on security and the market portfolio, respectively,
and is the error term with zero mean and constant variance. We use the TSX-CFMRC equal-
weighted index as the proxy for the market.24 We use the equal-weighted index instead of the
value-weighted index because of the large weighting of Nortel Networks in the value-weighted
index over part of the sample. Our results are robust when we use the TSX-CFMRC market-
weighted index.
We estimate a 2-factor market model that includes factors for both the overall market and the
target ﬁrms’ industry subindex (Halpern 1973). For any security , the 2-factor market model is:
,
where , , and are the period- returns on security , the market index, and the industry
subindex, respectively, and is the error term with zero mean and constant variance. We identify
ten subindexes based on Standard & Poor’s Global Industry Classiﬁcation Standard (GICS)
industry codes, and assign each target ﬁrm to the relevant industry index.
We aggregate individual abnormal returns across securities to generate average abnormal returns
(AARs). Given N events, the sample AARs for day  and its variance are
var ,
where is mean squared errors from the estimation regression for each ﬁrm . The AARs
are then aggregated over the event window to calculate the cumulative average abnormal return
(CAAR) for each security . For any interval in the event window, the CAAR and its
variance are calculated as
var var .
24. The average daily return on the TSX-CFMRC equal-weighted index is the sum of all deﬁned common
equity returns divided by the number of valid equity returns (Canadian-based ﬁrms only). Returns used
in this index are fully adjusted for distributions.
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We conduct two tests of the null hypothesis that the AARs or CAARs are zero, using a parametric
Z-test and a non-parametric, Wilcoxon signed-rank test. These tests are one-tailed, because we are
testing for the presence of positive abnormal returns in all cases.
We examine the volume of shares traded around our event of interest to determine whether there is
evidence of informed trading. Because raw trading volume is highly non-normal, Lo and Wang
(2000) recommend measuring volume using the log of daily turnover, where daily turnover is
daily trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding.25 We calculate two measures
of abnormal volume. First, we follow Chae (2005) and calculate abnormal volume for any
security i at event time t as:
,
where is log of turnover for ﬁrm on day . The estimation period for de-meaning the
individual ﬁrm’s log of turnover is [-250, -61]. A positive and statistically signiﬁcant value for a
given day suggests that, on average, a target ﬁrm experienced higher turnover on day than it did
on the average day over the window [-250, -61]. Second, we check the robustness of our measure
of abnormal volume by calculating abnormal volume using a market model similar to the one
used for returns. For any security , the market model is:
,
where is the individual ﬁrm’s log of turnover calculated as the log of (trading volume divided
by the number of shares outstanding) for ﬁrm on day , is the mean log of turnover for all
stocks captured in the TSX-CFMRC database on day , and is the error term with zero mean
and constant variance. The average abnormal volume (AAV), the cumulative average abnormal
volume (CAAV), and their statistical signiﬁcance are computed in a fashion similar to that for
AARs and CAARs.
25. Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992) perform their volume event study on the log of raw volume, controlling
for ﬁrst-order serial correlation and day-of-the-week patterns in share trading. Lo and Wang (2000) do
















5.1 Evidence of abnormal returns
Table 3 reports the AARs and CAARs for the whole sample over the window [-30,1] although
the CAARs are based on [-60,20]. The results are shown for both models used to estimate
abnormal returns: namely, the single-factor market model and the 2-factor market model with
an industry subindex. We denote the statistical significance of the AARs and CAARs based on
the parametric Z-test with asterisks, where three asterisks represent statistical significance at
the 1 per cent level and one asterisk represents significance at the 5 per cent level. The non-
parametric Wilcoxon test leads to similar results.26
The results in Table 3 are very similar for the different models, so we discuss only the results
estimated using the market model. AARs begin to show weak and episodic statistical signiﬁcance
over the window [-12,-5] that represents the two weeks prior to the ﬁrst public announcement of
the takeover bid. Up to this point, the percentage of AARs that are positive on any given day
across the 420 takeovers ﬂuctuates around 50 per cent, with a number of reversals consistent with
the predictions of the market anticipation hypothesis. The AARs become positive and signiﬁcant
only at the 99 per cent level shortly before the takeover announcement. There is a signiﬁcant
reaction on date 0 to the announcement itself, with an AAR of 9.8 per cent. The announcement
day AAR is 9.7 per cent using the 2-factor market model, and 9.8 per cent using the constant
mean return model (not shown). While three-quarters of the sample have a positive abnormal
return on day 0, fully one-quarter of the stocks have negative abnormal returns on the
announcement date. The AARs then become mostly negative but not statistically signiﬁcant over
the window [2,20].
The CAARs in Table 3 show a similar story. The CAARs are positive and statistically signiﬁcant
from day -2, very close to the announcement date. This pattern is repeated when using the 2-factor
market model, and starts sooner when using the constant mean return model. Using the market
model, the CAARs peak at 17.5 per cent on day 1, and then decline steadily to 15.9 per cent by
day 20 while remaining statistically signiﬁcant at the 99 per cent level. These results show that the
pre-bid run-up begins only in the days prior to the ﬁrst public announcement. The timing of this
run-up is more consistent with the market anticipation hypothesis, because speculative trading
becomes more intense shortly before the announcement, when uncertainty is reduced.
26. Any results discussed in this paper that are notshown are available uponrequest.19
CAARs are sensitive to the choice of window used for cumulating AARs. For this reason, Table 4
checks the robustness of our results by showing the CAARs calculated for different accumulation
periods and subsamples.27 We divide the sample into various subsamples to highlight the impact
of clustering by year and industry (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996), and the time period when the
takeover bid occurred due to the changing institutional setting. Column 1 in Table 4 shows the
results for all 420 takeover bids in our sample. The ﬁrst row shows that the CAAR for the period
[-60, 20] is 15.9 per cent. This CAAR is statistically signiﬁcant and economically important, and
is slightly larger than the 13.9 per cent reported by Jabbour, Jalilvand, and Switzer (2000).
Figure 1 shows that the AARs become positive and statistically signiﬁcant shortly before the
announcement date. The CAAR around the event date [0,1] is 11.9 per cent in Table 4, with the
AARs over the three days shown in the rows below. The announcement date has the highest
AAR (9.8 per cent), which suggests that the date of the ﬁrst announcement has been correctly
identiﬁed in our data. The announcement day AAR is almost double the 5.9 per cent reported by
Jabbour, Jalilvand, and Switzer (2000). The final row of Table 4 shows the ratio of the pre-bid
run-up [-60,-1] to the total run-up up to, and including the day after, the announcement [-60,1],
which Meulbroek (1992) terms the run-up index. The price run-up over the window [-60,-1] is
32.3 per cent of the CAAR over the window [-60,1], signiﬁcantly smaller than the 59.8 per cent
reported in Jabbour, Jalilvand, and Switzer (2000).
The high number of takeovers in the oil and gas sector, and the clustering of bids over a few key
periods, may be expected to generate higher CAARs for takeovers of natural resource ﬁrms than
for non-resource ﬁrms. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 report the CAARs for takeovers of natural
resource and non-natural resource ﬁrms, respectively. The CAARs of natural resource takeovers
are signiﬁcant and of similar magnitude to the overall sample, with the run-up occurring closer to
the announcement date. Contrary to our expectations, the CAAR of 5.9 per cent for the
period [-30,-1] is considerably smaller than the comparable CAAR for non-resource ﬁrms of
10.1 per cent. Likewise, the jump for natural resource takeovers over the event date [0,1] and on
day zero of the announcement is about two-thirds the size of the jump for non-natural resource
takeovers. The AARs for natural resource ﬁrms are very small and ﬂuctuate around zero, with the
run-up occurring only in the days before the announcement. By contrast, the CAARs for the non-
resource takeovers in this sample are larger and become statistically signiﬁcant around two weeks
prior to the announcement. Column 3 of Table 4 shows that the run-up index for non-resource
ﬁrms is close to 40.0 per cent.
27. Although we accumulate AARs estimated using the market model, similar results are found using the
2-factor market model or the constant mean returnmodel, and are available upon request.20
The resources devoted to enforcement of insider trading increased in 1998 after the OSC became
self-funded, at the same time that the TSX closed its trading ﬂoor and moved all stocks to the
electronic trading system. Greater enforcement budgets should be associated with less insider
trading, because the probability of getting caught increases. The move to electronic trading may
have reduced the leakage of information from brokers to market makers, as suggested by
Garﬁnkel and Nimalendran (2003), who ﬁnd that anonymity is greater on electronic trading
systems than on trading ﬂoors. Both changes lead us to expect that pre-bid price run-ups should be
smaller post-1997 than during the earlier period.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 compare the results for 227 takeovers announced from 1985 to 1997
with the results for 217 deals announced from 1998 to 2002. Contrary to our expectations, both
the pre-bid price run-ups and the jump over the event window [0,1] were larger for takeovers
announced after 1997. The CAAR of 10.5 per cent over the window [-30, -1] for deals announced
from 1998 to 2002 is more than twice as large as the CAAR of 4.9 per cent for takeovers
announced from 1985 to 1997. The CAARs for other subperiods are similarly larger. Pre-bid price
run-ups from [-60,-1] for takeovers from 1998 to 2002 were the largest, and have the largest run-
up index of 42 per cent. The price run-up begins at day -20 but accelerates from day -10. The
CAARs for takeovers from 1985 to 1997 are smaller and become statistically signiﬁcant only on
the announcement date. The larger run-ups from 1998 to 2002, in combination with the higher
number of rumours in the ﬁnancial media, suggest that the market’s ability to anticipate the timing
and target of a takeover bid has improved.
Table 5 compares the pre-bid run-ups and the run-up index for our sample with the results of
earlier studies. Columns 1 to 5 report the results for studies of U.S. takeovers from 1975 to
1995.28 Despite focusing on different samples, as detailed in the footnotes to Table 5, the total
CAAR over the window [-20,1] between 20 and 30 per cent is remarkably consistent across the
U.S. studies. The other variables show greater variation. The pre-event CAAR over the window
[-20,-1] ranges from 8.1 to 14.2 per cent, while the jump around the announcement date [0,1]
ranges from 6.4 to 21.4 per cent. The run-up index ranges from 27.5 to 68.9 per cent. By contrast,
the studies of Canadian takeovers have consistently lower CAARs, although the run-up index is of
similar magnitude around 40 per cent. This comparison suggests that pre-bid run-ups for
Canadian takeovers are no worse than for U.S. takeovers.
28. We are not aware of any international studies that use daily data; as most studies of foreign takeovers,
such as that by Franks and Harris (1989), rely on monthly data.21
5.2 Evidence of abnormal volume
Table 3 also reports the AAVs and CAAVs over the window [-30,1], with CAAVs based on the
window [-60,20]. The results are shown for both models used to estimate abnormal volume:
namely, the ﬁrm-detrended model used by Chae (2005) and the market model. The results are
very similar using both models, so we focus on the ﬁrm-detrended model. We notice sporadic
days with signiﬁcantly positive AAV during the weeks ahead of the announcement, on days when
the percentage of ﬁrms with positive AAV was noticeably greater than 50 per cent. AAV becomes
consistently and signiﬁcantly positive at the 1 per cent level beginning from day -25, one month
prior to the takeover announcement, when the percentage of ﬁrms with positive AV rises close to
or above 60 per cent. High abnormal volume is not associated with high abnormal returns until
close to the announcement date, consistent with the predictions of the market anticipation
hypothesis. Gao and Oler (2004) ﬁnd a similar pattern of abnormal volume leading abnormal
returns for a sample of U.S. takeovers, which they ascribe to selling by risk arbitrageurs. Chae
(2005) also documents higher-than-normal volume prior to the announcement for takeovers.
There is a large increase in AAV on day zero, with AAV that is 8 to 10 times larger than that over
the previous weeks, demonstrating the importance of the announcement. This jump in volume on
the announcement day is consistent with Grundy and McNichols (1990), Harris and Raviv (1993),
and Kim and Verrecchia (1994), who argue that information announcements can affect volume
when investors have heterogeneous information, leading them to correct their previous forecasts
with different intensity. High positive AAV continues until the end of the post-event window,
which suggests that investors continue to trade on the new information after the uncertainty is
reduced. This ﬁnding is consistent with the results reported by Chae (2005).
In contrast to abnormal returns, CAAVs become statistically signiﬁcant from day -60, which
suggests that the target ﬁrm experiences higher-than-normal turnover far ahead of the
announcement date, whether measured against itself or the overall market. An investigation over
different time horizons (not shown) ﬁnds that CAAVs are not statistically signiﬁcant earlier than
day -60. Figure 2 shows this steady run-up in abnormal volume that accelerates around the
announcement date. This pattern is consistent with the predictions in competitive trading models,
where sophisticated investors take a position in a potential target early but speculate more
aggressively as the takeover announcement approaches, and then reduce their positions shortly
before the announcement. At the same time, the absence of statistically signiﬁcant abnormal
returns—whether AAR or CAAR—over much of this period suggests that this trading has little
information value, because it does not lead to a run-up in price.22
Table 6 provides the CAAVs for different windows and across different subsamples based on the
ﬁrm-detrended measure of abnormal volume. It is striking that the CAAVs for all accumulation
periods exhibit statistically higher abnormal volume relative to the window [-250,-61]. The
increase in CAAV for natural resource ﬁrms is close to the levels for ﬁrms in other industries: both
experience similar increases in turnover on the day of the announcement, with the run-up in
CAAV during the pre-event window [-60,-1] representing over 70 per cent of the abnormal
volume over the period, including the announcement date [-60,1]. The comparison between deals
announced from 1985 to 1997 and deals announced after 1997 indicates that the latter period
experienced higher CAAVs, with a larger reaction to the takeover announcement. An examination
of average turnover for the stocks covered in the TSX-CFMRC dataset (not shown) shows a sharp
increase in this measure beginning in 1997.29 The greater turnover on the TSX following 1997
may be due to the closing of the trading ﬂoor, the merging of regional exchanges under the TSX in
1999, or other factors that are not considered in the analysis.30 We leave this question for future
research.
5.3 Reaction of bid-ask spreads
While it does not allow us to distinguish between the two hypotheses, we examine whether there
is any reaction in bid-ask spreads ahead of takeover announcements in our sample. Strategic
trading models predict that the adverse selection component in the bid-ask spread should widen
during the presence of informed trading, although the effect may be offset if the inventory or the
order processing component declines. Empirically, insider trading studies report mixed results.
Cornell and Sirri (1992) and Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) ﬁnd that illegal insider trades
had no impact on bid-ask spreads or quoted depth. Fishe and Robe (2004) ﬁnd that insider trades
are associated with a decrease in depth and an increase in bid-ask spreads for stocks traded on the
NYSE and the AMEX, but not for stocks traded on the NASDAQ. They suggest the ability to
detect informed trading depends on market structure. Specialist markets are better able to detect
informed trading, while the diffuse nature of a dealer market makes it more difﬁcult for a given
dealer to determine the information content of the order ﬂow. Takeover studies also ﬁnd mixed
evidence: Chae (2005) and Gao and Oler (2004) report a widening of bid-ask spreads and a
29. Foerster and Keim (2000) document how the turnover on U.S. exchanges increased over this period,
with fewer days without trades for stocks listed on the NYSE and the AMEX.
30. In 1999, Canada’s markets were consolidated. The TSX assumed the role of the exchange for senior
equities. The former Alberta and Vancouver exchanges formed the Canadian Venture Exchange
(CDNX) and assumed control of junior equities, and the Montréal Exchange became the centre for
derivatives trading in Canada. The Winnipeg Stock Exchange and the equities portion of the Montréal
Exchange later merged with the CDNX.23
decline in quoted depth ahead of takeover announcements, but Conrad and Niden (1993) and
Jennings (1994) do not.
Table 7 reports the reaction to takeover announcements in our sample for two measures of the bid-
ask spread: the effective spread and the proportional effective spread. The effective spread is equal
to 2 times the absolute value of the difference between the closing price and the closing mid-
quote. The proportional effective spread is the effective spread divided by the closing mid-quote.
Average spreads are calculated for four time windows: an estimation window [-250,-61], a pre-
announcement window [-60,-1], an announcement window [0,1], and a post-announcement
window [2,20]. We conduct a simple -test of equality of means for the pre-announcement,
announcement, and post-announcement windows against the estimation window. We ﬁnd that the
bid-ask spread is narrower, not wider, during the pre-announcement window [-60,-1], measured
by the average effective spread, although it is not statistically different based on the average
proportional effective spread. For both measures, the bid-ask spread is lower following the
announcement relative to the estimation window [-250,-61], consistent with the drop in
uncertainty once the information event has passed. These mixed results do not provide any clear
outcome, although the market microstructure of the TSX—which lies between the specialist
model of the NYSE and the AMEX, and the dealer model of the NASDAQ—may explain these
results. The appendix provides more details on the market microstructure of the TSX.
5.4 Regressions of abnormal returns and volume
A naïve comparison of the abnormal returns and abnormal volume in Table 3 suggests that there
are almost no cases, on average, when both were observed on the same day. This relationship can
be easily conﬁrmed by viewing the scatter plot in Figure 3 for the pre-event window [-30,-1]. The
scatter plot reveals a cloud of points centred on the origin, with a few outliers that have either
positive or negative abnormal returns. Note that there are also a number of observations of
abnormally low volume with no abnormal returns towards the bottom of the ﬁgure, which
suggests that, for some of the sample, there are days with lower-than-average trading. Table 8
shows the simple correlation of abnormal returns to abnormal volume over the period [-30,-1] is
0.1235, or 12 per cent. By contrast, the correlation over the announcement window [0,1] is
0.3472, or 35 per cent.
A more formal test of the relationship between abnormal returns and abnormal volume is
provided by running panel regressions. Panel methods capture both the time-series dimension of
the data and the cross-sectional dimension, and assume a particular structural form for the
residuals (Wooldridge 2002). The panel variable is an identiﬁer for each takeover, , and the time
t
i24
variable is the day in event time, . These regressions are estimated using random effects, which
assumes that part of the residual is takeover-speciﬁc but random, although it remains unidentiﬁed.
This assumption is less restrictive than the ﬁxed-effects approach that assumes the takeover-
speciﬁc residual is constant over time. We include dummy variables for the year in which the
takeover occurred, with 2002 as the base case, and dummy variables for the ten Standard & Poor’s
GICS industries in our sample, with oil and gas ﬁrms as the base case. More details on this
estimation model are provided by Wooldridge (2002, chapter 10). The standard errors are adjusted
using a heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator to generate -statistics that are
robust to heteroscedasticity and possible autocorrelation up to some lag (White 1980).
Table 8 reports the results of this estimation over two separate windows. In all three cases,
abnormal returns are statistically associated with abnormal volume at the 1 per cent level,
although the small size of the coefﬁcient estimated for abnormal volume and the poor ﬁt of the
regression suggest that the relationship is not economically important. Column 1 shows the
estimation over the pre-event window [-30,-1], and ﬁnds that an increase of one standard deviation
in abnormal volume leads to an increase in abnormal returns of 1.4202 x 0.0047 = 67 basis points,
or 0.67 per cent. The ﬁt of the regression over this window is very low, at 1.7 per cent. Column 2
shows the relationship over the event window [0,1] where the overall R-squared is 14.4 per cent.
An increase of one standard deviation in abnormal volume over the announcement window [0,1]
is associated with an increase in abnormal returns of 1.7657 x 0.0260 = 4.59 per cent.
From these panel regressions, we conclude that abnormal returns during our pre-event window are
not importantly associated with abnormal volumes. This pattern is not consistent with the pattern
found in prior studies of illegal insider trading, but is consistent with the predictions for the
market anticipation hypothesis. We conclude that pre-bid run-ups are caused by market
anticipation, and not by information leakage due to insider trading.
6. Conclusion
We have studied 420 takeover announcements of Canadian-listed ﬁrms from 1985 to 2002 to
examine the price and volume dynamics in the target ﬁrm’s shares ahead of the ﬁrst public
announcement. Pre-bid run-ups in the target ﬁrm’s shares occurred shortly before the
announcement and were of comparable magnitude to the run-ups documented for U.S. takeovers,
which suggests a similar amount of price discovery in both countries. Contrary to our
expectations, run-ups were lower for ﬁrms in the natural resource sector, including oil and gas,
despite the high level of takeover activity and the clustering of deals in this sector. The size of
t
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price run-ups has increased since 1997, during a period when regulators devoted greater resources
to the monitoring of markets and the number of rumours about potential takeovers increased.
Pre-bid run-ups may be caused by information leakage due to illegal insider trading, market
anticipation by investors who correctly identify a potential takeover target prior to the
announcement, or some combination of both. We have reviewed two classes of models of
informed trading—namely, strategic and competitive trading models—that suggest different
price–volume dynamics based on the nature of informed trading. We have reviewed empirical
studies of known cases of illegal insider trading in the United States and trading ahead of
unscheduled announcements, and described the price–volume dynamics that we expected to be
associated with each hypothesis for explaining pre-bid run-ups.
We have found that the takeover targets experience signiﬁcantly positive and rising abnormal
volume beginning as early as 60 trading days prior to the ﬁrst announcement or disclosure of a
takeover bid. Abnormal volume is not accompanied by abnormal returns, which suggests that
there is information heterogeneity among investors. We ﬁnd a pattern of return reversals with
abnormal returns that ﬂuctuate around zero, consistent with a random walk. Positive and
statistically signiﬁcant abnormal returns occur only shortly before the announcement,
accompanied by signiﬁcantly positive abnormal volume. The targets’ stock price reacts
signiﬁcantly to the actual announcement, exhibiting both positive and negative abnormal returns,
accompanied by very high abnormal volume. These price–volume dynamics are more consistent
with the predictions of the market anticipation hypothesis than with the information leakage
hypothesis, which leads us to conclude that pre-bid run-ups are likely due to speculation by
sophisticated investors, rather than illegal insider trading by corporate insiders.
While this conclusion applies to the average takeover in our sample of 420 ﬁrms, we cannot
dismiss the possibility of illegal insider trading in any of the individual takeovers in our sample.
We note from our scatter plot (Figure 3) that there are a number of outliers that exhibit both
abnormal returns and abnormal volume prior to the announcement. Likewise, we have not
examined insider trading ahead of other important corporate events, such as earnings
announcements, dividend changes, and bankruptcy announcements. We leave these topics for
future research.26
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Table 1:  Predicted Price–Volume Dynamics under Competing Hypotheses
This table outlines the predicted price–volume dynamics under the competing hypotheses for
explaining pre-bid run-ups ahead of a takeover announcement. The predictions for the insider
trading hypothesis are based on the stylized facts from U.S. studies of known cases of illegal
insider trading, as well as a review of strategic trading models. The predictions of the market
anticipation hypothesis are based on empirical studies of trading behaviour ahead of unscheduled
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No pattern Serially correlated and rising close to
announcement date32
Table 2:  Summary Statistics for the Main Sample of 420 Takeovers, 1985–2002
Panel A: Market capitalization of target ﬁrms
Panel B: Annual breakdown of takeover bids with details on the number of completed (fully or
partially) deals, the number of hostile bids, the number of takeovers rumoured in the press, the































1985 7 29 14 71 0 14
1986 8 50 13 63 0 13
1987 7 57 14 71 14 57
1988 11 73 27 45 9 36
1989 18 67 6 39 17 22
1990 10 40 0 60 0 40
1991 5 80 0 80 20 20
1992 11 73 18 64 0 0
1993 14 57 7 64 14 7
1994 17 47 29 71 6 6
1995 29 69 21 69 21 17
1996 32 53 9 72 9 13
1997 39 67 31 56 18 28
1998 37 65 22 59 16 14
1999 34 68 9 26 26 21
2000 59 76 17 46 15 15
2001 56 82 7 61 18 14
2002 26 65 15 50 19 27
Total 420 67 15 56 15 1833
Table 3:  Average and Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Volume
for 420 Takeovers, 1985–2002
Average and cumulative abnormal returns were estimated using two models: a market model with
the CFMRC equal-weighted index, and a 2-factor market model with S&P/TSX sector indexes.
Average and cumulative abnormal volumes were estimated using two models: a ﬁrm-detrended
model and a market model. CAARs (CAAVs) are accumulated over the window [-60,20]. The
column % positive AR (AV) shows the percentage of deals where the abnormal returns (volume)












































-30 -0.08 46 -2.16 -0.03 45 -2.32 5.3 52 316.3*** 2.5 51 224.9***
-29 -0.24 44 -2.40 -0.20 47 -2.52 4.0 48 320.4*** 0.8 48 225.8***
-28 -0.06 46 -2.46 -0.06 47 -2.58 6.4 55 326.8*** 2.0 55 227.8***
-27 -0.27 48 -2.72 -0.38 49 -2.96 11.2* 55 338.1*** 6.6 53 234.4***
-26 0.06 45 -2.66 0.11 46 -2.85 11.2* 53 349.3*** 6.9 52 241.3***
-25 0.20 50 -2.46 0.24 51 -2.61 19.2*** 55 368.6*** 16.5*** 55 257.9***
-24 0.20 46 -2.25 0.24 47 -2.37 28.9*** 58 397.6*** 28.5*** 61 286.4***
-23 0.41 52 -1.84 0.37 52 -1.99 24.6*** 60 422.3*** 22.1*** 59 308.6***
-22 0.50* 51 -1.35 0.58*** 53 -1.41 33.4*** 61 455.7*** 31.0*** 61 339.6***
-21 0.05 50 -1.29 0.05 50 -1.36 26.7*** 59 482.5*** 24.7*** 59 364.3***
-20 0.08 46 -1.21 0.04 42 -1.32 20.3*** 56 502.8*** 19.1*** 54 383.4***
-19 -0.11 46 -1.32 -0.19 47 -1.51 21.2*** 57 524.0*** 18.2*** 57 401.6***
-18 -0.08 49 -1.40 -0.08 50 -1.60 30.3*** 57 554.4*** 27.7*** 57 429.4***
-17 -0.07 41 -1.47 -0.11 40 -1.70 27.8*** 60 582.2*** 23.1*** 57 452.5***
-16 0.14 50 -1.34 0.17 48 -1.54 27.0*** 58 609.3*** 25.9*** 58 478.4***
-15 0.19 48 -1.14 0.24 50 -1.29 31.9*** 60 641.2*** 28.0*** 60 506.5***
-14 0.41* 46 -0.73 0.42* 46 -0.88 25.4*** 59 666.7*** 22.3*** 59 528.9***
-13 -0.02 50 -0.75 -0.07 51 -0.94 29.9*** 57 696.6*** 26.0*** 56 554.9***
-12 0.41* 51 -0.34 0.30 49 -0.65 26.0*** 55 722.7*** 23.9*** 54 578.9***
-11 0.38 51 0.03 0.48* 51 -0.16 43.3*** 64 766.0*** 38.9*** 62 617.9***
-10 -0.35 46 -0.32 -0.49* 45 -0.65 25.8*** 54 791.9*** 23.5*** 55 641.4***
-9 0.43* 51 0.11 0.40* 51 -0.24 28.1*** 59 820.0*** 24.6*** 59 666.0***
-8 0.66*** 53 0.77 0.72*** 55 0.48 43.6*** 62 863.7*** 39.4*** 61 705.5***
-7 0.40* 52 1.17 0.44* 50 0.92 43.2*** 63 906.9*** 40.4*** 62 746.0***
-6 0.34 50 1.51 0.41* 52 1.33 32.8*** 62 939.8*** 30.2*** 60 776.3***
-5 0.35 46 1.86 0.40 46 1.73 43.3*** 65 983.2*** 41.1*** 63 817.4***
-4 0.77*** 52 2.63 0.82*** 54 2.55 42.9*** 62 1026.1*** 38.3*** 61 855.8***
-3 0.02 52 2.66 0.02 54 2.57 54.0*** 64 1080.1*** 51.1*** 63 906.9***
-2 1.45*** 60 4.11*** 1.35*** 60 3.92* 66.6*** 68 1146.8*** 62.7*** 67 969.6***
-1 1.55*** 59 5.66*** 1.48*** 59 5.40*** 84.7*** 74 1231.6*** 81.0*** 72 1050.6***
0 9.76*** 75 15.41*** 9.71*** 76 15.11*** 228.5*** 90 1460.1*** 223.0*** 90 1273.7***
1 2.11*** 56 17.52*** 2.40*** 58 17.51*** 249.3*** 94 1709.5*** 242.2*** 93 1515.9***
*** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% and * at 5% from a one-tailed Z-test.34
Table 4:  Cumulative average Abnormal Returns by Subsample, 1985–2002
Average and cumulative abnormal returns are estimated using a market model where the CFMRC
equal-weighted index is the proxy for the market. “Natural resources” consists of target ﬁrms
engaged in exploration, production, and transportation of oil, gas, minerals, metals, and other
commodity-related products.













[-60,20] 15.90*** 12.78*** 19.86*** 10.07*** 21.41***
[-60,-1] 5.66*** 3.13 8.83*** 1.66 9.45***
[-30,-1] 7.74*** 5.89*** 10.08*** 4.91*** 10.46***
[-20,-1] 6.95*** 5.80*** 8.39*** 4.77*** 9.05***
[-10,-1] 5.62*** 4.79*** 6.68*** 5.24*** 6.00***
[0,1] 11.87*** 10.42*** 13.71*** 10.65*** 13.00***
[-60,1] 17.52*** 13.57*** 22.54*** 12.31*** 22.44***
[2,20] -1.62 -0.8 -2.68* -2.24* -1.03
AARs (%):
-1 1.55*** 1.13*** 2.09*** 1.43*** 1.66***
0 9.76*** 8.48*** 11.42*** 8.40*** 11.03***




32.31 23.07 39.18 13.49 42.11
*** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% and * at 5% from a one-tailed Z-test.35
Table 5:  Comparison of Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns from Different Studies
CAAR [-i,-j] is the cumulative average abnormal return from day -i through day -j relative to the
announcement day (day 0). “Total CAAR” is calculated over the window [-20,1]. “Pre-event
CAAR” is over the window [-20,-1]. “Announcement CAAR” is over the window [0,1]. “Run-up
index” is the percentage of the total run-up that occurred before the announcement day, equal to



















al. (2000) This study
Sample period 1975-1978 1981-1985 1978-1986 1980-1989 1995 1985-1995 1985-2002
Sample size 194 172 30 145 50 128 420
Country U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Canada Canada
Total CAAR 25.7 28.3 29.5 30.6 20.6 12.7 18.9
Pre-event
CAAR
12.2 11.0 8.1 13.0 14.2 5.5 7.0
Announcement
CAAR
13.5 17.3 21.4 17.6 6.4 7.1 11.9
Run-up index 47.6 38.9 27.5 42.5 68.9 43.8 37.0
1. Successful takeovers only.
2. Cash offers only.
3. Deals with identiﬁable takeover initiation date. The total CAAR is calculated from the takeover initiation date to the announce-
ment date (day 0), the pre-event CAAR is from the takeover initiation date to day -2, and the announcement CAAR is [-1,0].
4. Alleged cases of insider trading only. The total CAAR is calculated over the window [-20,0], the pre-event CAAR is [-20,-1],
and the announcement CAAR is [-1,0].
5. Takeovers of ﬁrms cross-listed on NYSE and another U.S. exchange only.36
Table 6:  Cumulative Average Abnormal Volume for 420 Takeovers, 1985–2002
Each target’s abnormal volume in the event window [-60,20] is calculated as the log of daily
turnover minus the log of average daily turnover over the window [-250,-61] for the same target.
Daily turnover is calculated as daily volume divided by the number of shares outstanding.
Average abnormal volume (AAV) for day t=-60,…,20 is a cross-sectional mean of abnormal
volumes across all 420 targets. Cumulative average abnormal volume (CAAV) is a sum of average
abnormal volumes over a speciﬁc time period.













[-60,20] 3878.52*** 3707.79*** 4092.98*** 3268.95*** 4471.44***
[-60,-1] 1231.61*** 1198.77*** 1272.72*** 866.79*** 1583.62***
[-30,-1] 920.54*** 908.60*** 935.38*** 704.64*** 1127.98***
[-20,-1] 749.05*** 746.72*** 751.83*** 575.25*** 915.92***
[-10,-1] 465.54*** 428.46*** 512.65*** 366.53*** 560.57***
[0,1] 477.95*** 458.36*** 503.13*** 419.12*** 534.38***
[-60,1] 1709.55*** 1657.14*** 1775.84*** 1285.90*** 2118.01***
[2,20] 2168.97*** 2050.65*** 2317.14*** 198.31*** 2353.43***
AAVs (%):
-1 84.74*** 63.32*** 112.21*** 70.91*** 98.04***
0 228.58*** 220.20*** 239.41*** 187.87*** 267.33***




72.04 72.34 71.69 67.41 74.77
*** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% from a one-tailed Z-test.37
Table 7:  Average Spreads for 420 Takeovers, 1985–2002
Two types of spreads are calculated for each takeover target: the effective spread and the
proportional effective spread. The effective spread is equal to 2 times the absolute value of the
difference between the closing price and closing mid-quote. The proportional effective spread is
the effective spread divided by the closing mid-quote. Average spreads are calculated for four
time windows: an estimation window [-250,-61], a pre-announcement window [-60,-1], an
announcement window [0,1], and a post-announcement window [2,20]. We conduct a simple
t-test of equality of means for the pre-announcement, announcement, and post-announcement
















spread $0.1368 $0.1257*** $0.1088*** $0.0955***
Average proportional
effective spread 2.77% 2.75% 2.04%*** 1.99%***
*** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at 1% from a two-tailed t-test.38
Table 8:  Panel Regressions of Abnormal Returns and
Abnormal Volume for 420 Takeovers, 1985–2002
The panel regressions are estimated using random effects, with robust standard errors shown in
parentheses. The dependent variable is the abnormal return for each takeover i at time t, where
abnormal returns are estimated using a market model. The independent variables are abnormal
volume for each takeover i at time t, and dummy variables for the year of the takeover and the
10 GICS industries in our sample. The base case represents natural resource takeovers in 2002.



















Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12014 797 12811
Number of takeovers 420 406 420
R-squared (overall) 0.017 0.144 0.048
Wald chi-squared 206.8*** 129.2*** 645.2***
P-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
*** indicates signiﬁcance at 1%.
Panel B: Summary statistics over different windows
N Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Window [-30,-1]
Abnormal return 12,014 0.0026 0.0537 -0.6764 1.4859
Abnormal volume 12,283 0.3064 1.4202 -9.5620 6.3964
Window [0,1]
Abnormal return 797 0.0588 0.1301 -0.2959 0.8940
Abnormal volume 821 2.3908 1.7657 -4.9240 6.9542




Figure 1: Average and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns
for 420 Takeover Bids, 1985–2002
Figure 2: Average and Cumulative Average Abnormal Volume
for 420 Takeover Bids, 1985–200240
Figure 3: Scatter Plot of Abnormal Returns vs. Abnormal Volume
for 420 Takeover Bids, 1985–200241
Appendix
A.1 Regulation of insider trading in Canada
Insider trading in Canada is governed by both provincial securities laws and corporate law statutes
(MacIntosh and Nicholls 2002). Insider trading requirements apply only to companies that have
issued securities through a prospectus or takeover bid, or that are listed on a stock exchange.
Individuals and entities are considered corporate insiders if they are directors or senior ofﬁcers of
a reporting issuer or its subsidiary, or control more than 10 per cent of the voting shares.
Corporate insiders are permitted to buy or sell shares in their companies provided they report their
trades to securities regulators and do not trade when they have conﬁdential insider information.
These trading restrictions apply to a wider class of persons that have a “special relationship” with
a reporting issuer, such as members of the Board of Directors, the ﬁve highest-paid employees,
family members, and insiders of companies proposing to make a takeover bid, reorganization, or
similar business arrangement. Tippees are included in the deﬁnition of “special relationship”; a
tippee is a person who acquires material information from another person who is in the special
relationship.
A.2 Takeover process in Canada
The process of launching a takeover bid in Canada is similar to that in the United States, although
the responsibility for oversight and the regulatory requirements are different. Takeovers fall under
the jurisdiction of the provincial securities commission, because Canada does not have a single,
national securities regulator. This section describes the regulations in the Province of Ontario,
which are representative of the practice in the rest of Canada (MacIntosh and Nicholls 2002).
A takeover bid is deﬁned under the Ontario Securities Act as an offer to acquire a target ﬁrm’s
voting or equity securities, where the bidder seeks to acquire 20 per cent or more of an
outstanding class of voting securities. To launch a takeover bid, a bidder must either deliver a
formal bid document to all of the target security holders, or publish a detailed announcement in a
major daily newspaper and deliver a copy of the bid to the target’s head ofﬁce.1 Under continuous
disclosure rules, bidders would typically be required to issue a press release indicating their intent
in advance of their bid. A bidder would then have to send a bid circular to all target shareholders.
The takeover bid circular discloses important transaction details such as the terms of the bid,
method of payment, acquirer’s current holdings of the target’s securities (“toeholds”), any plans
for material changes in the operation of the target’s business, and any arrangements between the
acquirer and the directors or ofﬁcers of the target.
1. Prior to 31 March 2001, formal takeover bids in Ontario could be commenced only by delivering a bid
document.42
Current Ontario legislation limits the acquirer’s ability to gain control by making anonymous
purchases in the market. Any person acquiring control of 10 per cent or more of an issuer’s
securities must ﬁle a report with the OSC. This report must disclose the buyer’s intention for
purchasing the securities (i.e., investment or gain of control). Every subsequent increase in the
securities under control by 2 per cent above this 10 per cent threshold must be accompanied by a
press release and an “early warning” report ﬁled with the commission.
A.3 The Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX)
Electronic trading was ﬁrst introduced in 1977 when the computer-assisted trading system
(CATS) was introduced to cover inactive stocks. More stocks were added over the 1990s, with all
remaining stocks brought online in early 1997. At that time, the TSX closed its trading ﬂoor,
although the upstairs market continues to operate (Smith, Turnbull, and White 2001). The engine
running the CATS system was further improved in 2001.
The TSX uses a centralized electronic order-matching system similar to the Paris Bourse and the
Tokyo Stock Exchange.2 Similar to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the TSX opens as a
call market, and functions as a continuous auction market after the open. While both the NYSE
and the TSX have a market-making structure, market makers on the TSX—termed Registered
Traders (RTs)—have less ability to disrupt and take precedence over the public limit orders than
do NYSE specialists. An RT cannot halt trading at their own discretion, and their main focus is
providing liquidity for small orders. Given the limited role of the RT, Smith, Turnbull, and White
(2001) argue that the TSX operates more like a pure limit-order market—similar to the Paris
Bourse and the Tokyo Stock Exchange—than like the NYSE.
All TSX orders go initially to an upstairs market, which consists of the trading desks of member
ﬁrms. The market maker who receives the order has up to 15 minutes to decide whether (i) to try
and ﬁll the order as either a principal or to cross the order with another client as agent, or (ii) to
send the order downstairs to the consolidated limit-order book. These market makers see all order
ﬂow on a non-anonymous basis and can selectively participate in handling these orders. Orders
that are matched or “crossed” in the upstairs market are recorded as “put-throughs” in the
consolidated electronic order book that comprises the downstairs market. Orders that are not ﬁlled
upstairs are transmitted to the downstairs market and are entered in the consolidated electronic
order book as limit orders, with market orders entered as limits at the price on the opposite side of
the book.
2. The material in this section isbased on Grifﬁths et al. (2000) and Smith, Turnbull, and White (2001).Bank of Canada Working Papers
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